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SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a 
municipal corporation of 
the State of Utah, 
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
LEE R. MEYERS 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was the letter from defendant Salt Lake City's 
Police Chief to the plaintiff,informing him of the City's 
conclusion that the event he complained of did occur,properly 
received in evidence as a relevant admission by a party within 
the meaning of Rules 401 and 804(D)(2) of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence? 
2. Did the City preserve as a contention of error 
on appeal its objection to the receipt of the letter on the 
grounds that (a) the letter is a "subsequent remedial measure" 
within the meaning of Rule 407 of the Rules of Evidence; 
(b) the letter is subject to the executive privilege established 
by Utah Code Ann. §78-24-8, and (c) the letter's prejudicial 
impact substantially outweighs its probative value within 
the meaning of Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence? 
3. If the letter was improperly received in evidence, 
did it likely have a substantial effect on the jury's decision? 
STATUTES AND RULES OF 
EVIDENCE REQUIRING INTER-
PRETATION 
Utah Code Ann. §78-24-8(5)(Supp. 1986). 
Privileged Communications. There 
are particular relations in 
which it is the policy of the law 
to encourage confidence and to 
preserve it inviolate. Therefore, 
a person cannot be examined as 
a witness in the following cases: 
* * * 
(5) A public officer cannot 
be examined as to communications 
made to him in official confidence 
when public interest would suffer 
by the disclosure. 
Rules 801(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
(2) Admission by party opponent. 
The statement is offered 
against a party and is (~A) his 
own statement, either in his 
individual or representative 
capacity, or (B) a statement of 
which he has manifested his 
adoption or belief in its truth, 
or (C) a statement by a person 
authorized by him to make a 
statement concerning the subject, 
or (D) a statement by his agent or 
employee, made during the 
existence of the relationship; 
or (E) a statement by a co-
conspirator of a party during 
the course and in furtherance 
of the conspiracy. 
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Relevant evidence means evidence 
having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. 
Rule 4-03 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by consider-
ations of undue delay, waste of time 
or needless presentation of 
cummulative evidence. 
Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Error may not be predicated upon 
a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial 
right of the party is affected . . . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Lee Meyers brought this negligece action against 
Salt Lake City for an injury he sustained when City police 
officer J.R. Nelson slammed a car door on his ankle. 
(Prior to trial, a second cause of action against Officer 
Nelson for intentional injury was voluntarily dismissed). 
A jury trial was held on October 29, 30 and 31, 
1985, before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup. The evidence 
received at trial included a letter mailed to the plaintiff 
from Chief of Police Bud Willoughby and Lt. W.C. Duncan to 
which the City objected. The jury found in a special verdict 
that both the plaintiff and defendant were negligent and that 
their negligence jointly caused plaintiff's injury. They 
found the City to be 99% negligent in causing the injury and 
the plaintiff, 1%. The jury found special damages in the 
amount of $6,740.88 lost wages, $5,221.96 medical expenses, 
and $15,000 in general damages. The award was reduced by 
1% for plaintiff's negligence, and by $4,015.79 ,representing 
a portion of medical expenses previously paid by Salt Lake 
City. Judgment was entered for $22,676.55 plus interest 
and costs. (R.2477). 
Plaintiff moved for a new trial on damages or an 
additure, (R.254) and defendant moved for a new trial on the 
ground that the City's letter to the plaintiff should not 
have been received in evidence (R.251). Both motions were 
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denied (R.264) and the City brought this appeal. The plaintiff/ 
respondent's motion for a summary disposition of the appeal 
was denied by this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Lee Meyers is an employee of Salt Lake 
City Parks Department . He was on his way to work on May 31, 
1983, during flooding which required rerouting of traffic 
in downtown Salt Lake City, when the incident which gave rise 
to this action occurred. (R.373. ) Plaintiff's wife, Denice 
Meyers, was a passenger in the car. 
At the intersection of Sixth South and Main Streets , 
plaintiff attempted to make a left turn following several 
other cars which had been permitted to do so. At that point, 
Officer J.R. Nelson ,who was directing traffic at the intersection, 
came over to plaintiff's car, shouted at him, and began slamming 
his fist on the hood and the side of the vehicle. (R.300-
303, 379-383). Plaintiff stopped his car, opened the door, 
and began to get out to talk to the officer and to observe 
what damage had been done. Officer Nelson shouted at the 
plaintiff to get back in the car, and as Meyers was sitting 
back down, the officer put his hands on the car door and forced 
it shut on plaintiff's left ankle, continuing to apply pressure 
despite plaintiff's protests. (R.303-304, 384-387). He then 
pulled plaintiff out of the car, and was in the process of 
placing him under arrest when Officer Robyn Howell, who was 
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also stationed at the intersection, intervened. Howell pursuaded 
Nelson not to arrest the plaintiff, and instructed plaintiff 
to leave the intersection (R. 338-341, 388). These events 
were observed by Denice Meyers and by Gary Clark, the driver 
of the car immediately behind the plaintiff's at the time. 
Both testified, as did Officer Howell. 
After discussing the incident with a supervisor 
of Officer Nelson at another location, plaintiff was directed 
to the police department's Internal Affairs Unit where he 
filed a formal complaint about Nelson's use of excessive force 
against him,noting the injury to his left ankle (R. 182, 391). 
He pointed out to Lt. Duncan the dents in his car caused by 
Officer Nelson's fist, and the impression in the door caused 
by forcing it against his leg. 
Immediately afterwards, Mr. Meyers went to the emergency 
room at L.D.S. Hospital where his ankle was observed to be 
tender and swollen and bruises on his arm were noted (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit, R. 188). The emergency room physician, Dr. 
Ray Thomason, diagnosed the ankle injury as a sprain, and 
instructed Meyers to return in three days. When the injury 
had not healed, the plaintiff was referred to Dr. Thomas Bauman, 
an orthopedic surgeon, who performed further diagnostic tests 
and identified the injury as a severe ligament disruption 
and tear. Plaintiff remained under Dr. Bauman's care for 
the next two years. Three separate surgeries were required to 
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treat plaintiff's injuries, and after considerable pain and 
limitation of his activities, he was left with a serious permanent 
impairment. (R. 4-66, 4-94). 
Approximately one month after this incident and 
the filing of the Internal Affairs Complaint, plaintiff received 
by mail a letter on Salt Lake City Police Department stationary 
signed by Lt. W.C. Duncan of the Internal Affairs Division, 
under the name of Chief Bud Willoughby. (The letter is reproduced 
as Exhibit A in the appendix). The letter refers to plaintiff's 
complaint "charging Officer James R. Nelson with excessive 
force . . . relative to an incident which occurred on 5/31/83 
at 6th South and Main Street." It informed plaintiff that 
the investigation was completed and that 
. . . the allegations contained 
in your complaint was determined 
to be "sustained" by the Officer's 
division commander, Captain O.J. Peck. 
"Sustained" means: The event 
did occur and the officer is 
guilty of the complaint alleged 
or other infraction. 
The plaintiff was thanked for bringing the matter to their 
attention, and invited to contact Lt. Duncan if he had any 
questions. 
Later, this action was brought. In answering plaintiff's 
complaint, the City denied that Officer Nelson had acted negli-
gently or had caused any injury to the plaintiff (R. 19-20). 
Because of the apparrant inconsistency between the City's 
letter to the plaintiff and its pleading, plaintiff's counsel 
was permitted by the district court to examine the City's 
file relating to its internal affairs investigation (R.108-
110). Prior to trial, the City filed a motion in limine in 
which the court was asked to restrain the plaintiff from "intro-
ducing evidence of or referring to the disposition of the 
Internal Affairs investigation" on the ground that such information 
was irrelevant and immaterial to the lawsuit (R. 227, 236). 
In response to the motion in limine, and again during 
trial, plaintiff offered the letter he received from the police 
chief as well as two documents from the internal affairs file: 
plaintiff's written complaint (R. 182)(Exhibit B) and a document 
entitled "complaint disposition review" (R. 184)(Exhibit C). 
The court ruled that the two documents from the police file 
were inadmissible but that the letter could be received as 
an admission of a party (R. 279-280). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The disputed letter is defined as non-hearsay 
under the Rules of Evidence since it constitutes an admission 
of a party, and is relevant because it concerns facts which 
are in issue in this action. 
2. The City's remaining evidentiary objections 
were raised for the first time in post rial proceedings. 
Those objections; first, that the letter discloses subsequent 
remedial measures; second, that the letter is protected by 
a statutory or common lawexecutive privilege, and third, that 
the prejudicial impact of the letter outweighs its probative 
value, are meritless anyway. 
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3. In addition to the letter, there is substantial, 
uncontradicted evidence of the City's liability for the plaintiff's 
injury. Therefore, it if was error to receive the letter 
in evidence, it was harmless error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE POLICE CHIEF'S LETTER TO THE 
PLAINTIFF WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED 
IN EVIDENCE AS AN ADMISSION 
BY A PARTY ON A SUBJECT RELEVANT 
TO THE ACTION. 
The letter whose admissibility is the subject of 
this appeal is a classic example of an extrajudicial statement 
by a party which is not subject to hearsay objection under 
Rule 801(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Statements which are not hearsay. 
A statement is not hearsay if 
"k ">V "k 
(2) Admission by party opponent. 
The statement is offered against 
a party and is fa") his own 
statement, either in his individual 
or representative capacity, or 
(B) a statement of which he has 
manifested his adoption or belief 
in its truth, or (C) a statement 
by a person authorized by him to 
make a statement concerning this 
subject, or (D) a statement by 
his agent or servant concerning 
a matter within the scope of 
nis agency or employment, made 
during trie existence of the 
relationship; or 0D a statement 
by a co-conspirator of a party 
during the course and in further-
ance of the conspiracy. 
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The letter in issue was offered against a party, 
the defendant Salt Lake City. It was made by agents of Salt 
Lake City, Chief of Police Willoughby and Lt. Duncan, during 
the existence of their employment relationship. The City 
has never contended that the subject matter of the letter 
was outside the scope of the employment of its authors; the 
chief of police is the city officer responsible for the entire 
police department, and Lt. Duncan is the person to whom the 
investigation which is the subject of the letter was assigned. 
On the same ground, in a very similar case, the 
Alaska Supreme Court ruled that a memorandum reflecting the 
results of an internal police department investigation of 
an officer's culpability for a traffic accident should have 
been received in evidence in a civil trial arising out of 
the accident. Rutherford v. State, 605 P.2d 16 (Alaksa 1979). 
The Alaska Court held that as a memorandum prepared by agents 
of the City authorized to investigate the accident it was admissible 
as substantive evidence of the facts admitted, without regard 
to whether the admissions were in the form of opinion or were 
based on other than first hand knowledge, and without the 
foundation or predicate ordinarily required for impeaching 
evidence. 
The only hearsay objection presently in issue is 
one the City raises for the first time on appeal, that the 
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trial court erred in admitting the letter without first deter-
mining that the declarant was unavailable. This argument 
is completely without merit. If a written statement satisfies 
the requirements of Rule 801(d), it is a "statement which 
is not hearsay" and any hearsay objection is overcome without 
regard to the availability of the declarant. (Confusion may 
arise since the Rules require a showing of unavailability 
before the prior statement against interest of a non-party 
is received under Rule 804(b)(4), A party is ,of course, 
available by virtue of its presence at trial). 
The actual basis of the City's objection to the 
letter at trial was that it is irrelevant and immaterial to 
the issues of the case. 
Rule 4-01 of the Utah Rules of Evidence defines relevant 
evidence as follows: 
Relevant evidence means evidence 
having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. 
The letter in question, by its terms, relates to 
"an incident which occurred on 5/31/83 at 6th South and Main 
Street", and which led Lee Meyers to charge Officer Nelson 
"with excessive force". This action was filed because of 
an incident on that date at that location, and the plaintiff's 
claim is that Officer Nelson physically injured him through 
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the use of unreasonable force. The letter and lawsuit obviously 
relate to the same subject matter, and any doubt is removedby 
comparing the letter with the plaintiff's internal affairs 
complaint (Exhibit B). 
The critical admission in the letter is that the 
complaint was "sustained" and that sustained means "the event 
did occur." In effect, the City, through its agents, said 
that it investigated the charge made by Lee Meyers that certain 
events occurred, including the use by an officer of "excessive 
force", and that the City concluded that these events did 
occur and the officer did use excessive force. 
Whether or not Officer Nelson used excessive force 
in his interactions with Lee Meyers is "a fact of consequence 
to the determination of the action." That the City admitted 
he used excessive force is definitely evidence having a tendency 
to make it more probable that he did. The very basis for 
what this Court has called "the age old common law exception 
to the hearsay rule known as an admission of a party", State 
v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Utah 1980), is the natural 
presumption that a party's admission against its own interest 
tends to be reliable. 
The City contends that its conclusion that Officer 
Nelson was guilty of excessive force was based upon different 
evidentiary standards than those which apply in a civil action 
and that its use of the phrase "guilty of the complaint alleged 
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or other infraction" means that Nelson might have been found 
guilty of violating an administrative rule unrelated to the 
elements of a tort action. 
Even if these contentions had any bearing on the 
relevancy of the letter, they are not accurate. The complaint 
disposition review sheet from the City's internal affairs 
file establishes both the basis of the City's conclusions 
and the evidentiary standard employed (R. 184, Exhibit C). 
First, the form describes the four findings which 
might be made as a result of an internal affairs investigation: 
UNFOUNDED - The complaint, as reported, didn't occur. 
EXONERATED - The event did occur as reported, but 
the officer's actions were lawful 
and reasonable. 
NOT SUSTAINED - Facts do not support a conclusion 
of guilt or innocence on the part 
of the officer. Therefore, the 
complaint is resolved in his favor. 
SUSTAINED - The event did occur and the officer 
is guilty of the complaint alleged or 
other infraction. 
It is noteworthy that before a complaint against 
an officer is sustained, the Internal Affairs Department must 
conclude both that the event complained of occurred and that 
the conduct of the officer was not lawful and reasonable. 
Furthermore, the evidence considered must preponderate against 
the officer before a complaint will be sustained. 
The comments of Division Commander Peck also establish 
that the basis of the finding was the same conduct which 
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was the subject of the lawsuit: Nelson's use of unreasonable 
force which caused an injury to the plaintiff. 
Although the complaintant was 
wrong in making the left turn 
described, I feel the Officer 
over reacted and used excessive 
force. The available physical 
evidence, i.e., bruises and dis-
coloration of the complaintant's 
skin and the dents and marks on the auto-
mobile are consistent with the 
complaintant's allegations. All 
witnesses, except Nelson, agreed 
substantially on what took place 
with the exception of Nelson calling the 
complaintant a SOB. (R. 184)(Appendix C). 
Neither the evidentiary standards nor the factual 
findings which led to the July 1 letter are so different from 
those employed in the tort action as to render the letter 
irrelevant. 
Most importantly, it should be recognized that it 
is not the burden of one offering the extrajudicial statement 
of a party opponent to establish the underlying reasons for 
the admission. Once the requirements of Rule 801 are satisfied 
as to a statement which relates to the subject matter of the 
lawsuit, the statement should be admitted. The party who 
made the statement is then free to explain the basis or the 
context of the statement, or even to disavow it, through his 
own testimony. Michael v. Bauman, 76 N.M. 255, 413 P.2d 888 
(1966). 
As the Supreme Court of Hawaii said in reference 
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to the identical evidentiary provision, 
'The extrajudicial statements 
of a party opponent, when offered 
against the same, are universally 
deemed admissible at trial as 
substantive evidence of the fact 
or facts stated.' [P]arty 
admissions, unlike statements 
against interest, need not have 
been against the declarant's 
interest when made, need not 
be based on the declarant's personal 
knowledge, may be in the form of an 
opinion, and are admissible at 
trial regardless of whether the 
declarant is unavailable.' 
Their free admissibility 'is 
grounded upon the adversary theory 
of litigation' rather than any 
circumstantial indicia of reliability. 
* * * 
'A party can hardly object that 
he had no opportunity to cross-
examine himself or that he is 
unworthy of credence save when 
speaking under sanction of an 
oath.' And if his earlier state-
ment is not repeated accurately, 'he 
now as opponent has the full 
opportunity to put himself on 
the stand and explain his former 
assertion. ' 4 Wigmore, Evidence 
§1048 (Chadbourn rev. 1972). 
(Citations omitted); Shea v. City and County of Honolulu, 
692 P.2d 1158, 1165 (Hawaii 1985). 
The City in this case had every opportunity to 
explain its prior statement, both by calling witnesses, and 
through argument. (R. 283-285). Nothing more was required. 
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POINT 2 
THE CITY'S REMAINING EVIDEN-
TIARY OBJECTIONS WERE NOT 
MADE AT TRIAL AND CANNOT BE 
RAISED ON APPEAL. 
In addition to challenging its relevance and materiality, 
the City raises three grounds of error in the admission of 
the July 1 letter; first, that the letter was evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures within the meaning of Rule 40 7 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence; second, that the letter is 
protected by the official information privilege established 
by Utah Code Anno.§78-24-8, and third, that if the letter 
is relevant, its unfairly prejudicial impact substantially 
outweighs its probative value within the meaning of Rule 403 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
None of these grounds for objection to the admissibility 
of the letter were asserted by the City at trial. The City's 
motion in limine states no grounds (R.227) and its memorandum 
deals exclusively with the question of relevance and materia-
lability (R. 236). Similarly, in oral argument on the motion, 
those grounds were not asserted and only hearsay, relevance 
and materiality were discussed (R. 273-286). The additional 
grounds were raised for the first time in the City's motion 
for a new trial (R. 251), and are asserted again on appeal. 
In the case of Barson v. E.R. Squibb, 682 P.2d 832 
(Utah 1984) the defendant drug manufacturer objected 
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at trial to the receipt in evidence of package inserts published 
after the date of the injury out of which the action arose. 
At trial, the sole contention was that the prejudicial impact 
of the documents outweighed their probative value within 
the meaning of former Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
In a motion for a new trial and on appeal the company argued 
that the documents were hearsay and should have been excluded 
on that ground as well. Declining to consider that claim 
of error, this Court stated, as follows: 
The burden is always on the party 
objecting to make certain that the 
record adequately preserves an 
objection or argument for review 
in the event of an appeal. 
In order to preserve a contention 
of error on appeal, the party 
claiming error in admission of 
evidence must raise the objection 
to the trial court in clear and 
concise terms and in a timely 
fashion calculated to obtain a 
ruling thereon. Where there was 
no clear and definite objection 
on the basis of hearsay, that 
theory cannot now be raised on appeal. 
Squibb did raise a hearsay 
objection after judgment was 
entered in the case. However 
issues raised for the first time in 
post-judgment motions are raised 
too late to be reviewed on appeal. 
Therefore, we are precluded 
from addressing this assertion 
of error on the merits. 
Barson v. E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc., supra, 682 P.2d at 
837-838. 
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This Court ought not to reach the merits of the 
three objections raised for the first time after trial. 
Nevertheless, each will be briefly addressed. 
(1) Subsequent remedial measures. Rule 407 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence states, as follows: 
When, after an event, measures are 
taken which, if taken previously, 
would have made the event less 
likely to occur, evidence of the 
subsequent measures is not 
admissible to prove negligence 
or culpable conduct in connection 
with the event. This rule does 
not require the exclusion of evidence 
of subsequent measures when offered 
for another purpose, such as proving 
ownership, control, or feasibility 
of precautionary measures, if 
if controverted, or impeachment. 
By its terms, this rule has no application to the July 1 
letter. The letter contains no reference to a measure taken 
after an event " . . . which, if taken previously, would have 
made the event less likely to occur." It does not, for example, 
inform Mr. Meyers that Officer Nelson was suspended for a 
day as a result of his conduct. 
Rule 407 "prohibits evidence of post-accident changes 
that make things different or better than they were at the 
time of an accident." Patrick v. South Central Bell Tel. 
Co., 641 F.2d 1192, 1196 (6th Cir. 1980). No such changes 
are referred to in the disputed letter. The rule does not 
prohibit "competent evidence resulting from an internal investi-
gation of a mishap", Westmorland v. CBS, In ., 601 F. Supp. 66 
(S.D.N.Y 1984), which is what the plaintiff offered in this instance. 
2. Official Privilege. Utah Code Ann, §78-24-8(5) 
(Supp. 1986), the section relied upon by the City as the basis 
of its claim for privilege, provides, as follows: 
Privileged Communications. There 
are particular relations in 
which it is the policy of the law 
to encourage confidence and to 
preserve it inviolate. Therefore, 
a person cannot be examined as 
a witness in the following cases: 
Vc Vc -A" 
(5) A public officer cannot be 
examined as to communications 
made to him in official confidence 
when public interest would suffer 
by the disclosure. 
Lt. Duncan and Chief Willoughby were not examined 
as witnesses about their internal investigation of the plaintiff's 
injuries. They mailed a letter to the plaintiff who offered 
it in evidence himself. This statutory provision has no application 
whatsoever to the admissibility of the letter. 
The City also cites cases which address the appli-
cability of a common law "official information privilege" 
to discovery requests for access to confidential executive 
files, e.g., Martinelli v. District Court In and For City 
Etc., 612 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1980); Denver Policemen's Protective 
Ass'n. v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1981). These 
decisions and the standards they express were fully considered 
by the trial court in ruling on the plaintiff's pretrial 
discovery motions requesting access to the internal Affairs 
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file in the first instance (R. 49-93, 108-109). The pre-trial 
discovery order is not the subject of this appeal. The official 
information privilege can have no bearing on the admissibility 
of the disputed letter since the exhibit was not obtained 
through disclosure of confidential information in official 
files. Any privilege that might arguably apply to the results 
of an official internal investigation was waived as to the 
contents of the letter the City voluntarily mailed to the 
plaintiff. 
(c) Rule 405. Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
provides, as follows: 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by consider-
ations of undue delay, waste of 
time or needless presentation 
of cummulative evidence. 
The City contends that the disputed letter confused 
the issues, misled the jury ,and unfairly prejudiced the City's 
defense because "the jury was never instructed that the determin-
ation made in the letter was not based upon negligence"or that 
the determination was based upon "an entirely different 
factual and legal standard than that which concerned the 
tort case", and because the letter left it unclear whether 
the conduct evaluated by the City was the same conduct involved 
in the civil case. (Brief of Appellant, p. 26). 
-20-
There is no merit to the City's argument that an 
admission of a party is unfairly prejudicial unless the declarant 
weighed the relevant evidence according to the standards 
applicable in a civil trial before making the statement which 
is offered. If this were so, admissions of a party would 
almost never come into evidence since people do not customarily 
engage in something akin to the civil trial process before 
making extra-judicial statements, see, e.g., Walters v. Querry, 
588 P.2d 702, 703 (1978), in which this court affirmed 
the admissibility of a statement made by a party to an automobile 
accident moments afterwards that "she felt like she was the 
cause of the accident." 
The City's suggestion that the July 1 letter might 
have related to facts other than those which plaintiff attempted 
to prove is simply not substantiated by the record. As discussed 
previously, the complaint review sheet describes exactly what 
conduct the investigator dealt with, and demonstrated that 
the facts were reviewed by the City under standards similar 
to those employed in civil litigation. (Appendix C). 
All admissions by parties are prejudicial; they 
are objectionable only if their unfairly prejudicial qualities 
substantially outweigh their probative value. As noted previously, 
the City had the right to explain and even to contradict its 
prior admission if it chose to, and was given the opportunity 
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to do so. Michael v. Bauman, supra, (R. 284-285). The City 
has not shown how Rule 403 was violated by receipt of the 
letter. 
POINT 3 
ANY ERROR IN RECEIPT OF THE 
LETTER WAS HARMLESS. 
Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides 
that 
Error may not be predicated upon 
a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial 
right of the party is affected . . . 
This Court has consistently held that 
. . . The fact alone that evidence 
was erroniously admitted [is not] 
sufficient to set aside a verdict 
unless it has 'had a substantial 
influence in bringing about the 
verdict'. 
Pearce v. Wistinson, 701 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1985). Or, as 
this Court has also said, error in the admission of evidence 
. . . does not rise to the level 
of prejudicial error unless there 
is a reasonable likelihood that 
the jury would have reached 
a different result if the error 
had not occurred. 
Dowland v. Lyman Products for Shooters, 642 P.2d 380, 
381 (Utah 1982). 
There is no likelihood at all that the jury would 
have reached a different verdict had it not been for admission 
of the disputed letter. The evidence that Officer Nelson 
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slammed the car door on the plaintiff's ankle was actually 
uncontradicted. The plaintiff, his wife, and the driver of 
the car behind him all described that event (R. 302-304, 384-
387, 502). Even Officer Nelson did not deny it, testifying 
simply that he did not remember whether he closed the door 
on plaintiff's foot, and therefore neither admitted nor denied 
having done so (R. 334). 
The City contends that the letter's effect on the 
jury's decision is apparent from its finding of liability 
despite evidence that the injury did not occur in the manner 
plaintiff claimed and evidence that the whole incident was 
plaintiff's fault. 
In arguing that the jury disregarded evidence that 
the injury did not occur as alleged, the City has seriously 
mischaracterized the record. First, the City contends 
1. The plaintiff's ankle injury 
could not have been sustained by the 
compression of a door on the ankle; 
Rather, plaintiff Meyers' own physician 
testified it must have been the result 
of a twisting action. No twisting 
action occurred at the scene. 
(Brief of Appellant, p. 27). Dr. Thomas Bauman did, in fact, 
testify that the type of sprain the plaintiff suffered typically 
occurs as a result of "an inward twist or hyperplantar flexion 
. . . such as would occur if your foot was forced markedly 
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down into flexion . . . "(R. 487). 
In his testimony, the plaintiff testified that he 
sustained such a twisting injury when his foot was trapped 
in the car door and demonstrated it to the jury: 
I sat back down and I went to pull 
my foot up, you know, to put it 
in, you know and he caught it right 
on the ankle part here, twisting my 
foot and twisting — caught it right 
in the door . . . 
(R. 385-386). 
JL. J^  J-
Q. And do you remember at what 
angle your foot was caught 
at that point? 
A. Yes. It was -- I can't twist 
it now, but it was in a twisty — 
I was trying to pull it out of there 
because I could feel it start 
hurting. I was pulling up. 
(R. 386). 
Dr. Ray Thomason, the physician who treated the 
plaintiff in the emergency room the morning of the injury, 
gave the following explanation of the manner in which the 
ankle sprain occurred: 
Q. (Mr. Hawkins) I do have one more 
question, and that is, Doctor: 
If the door is shutting with equal 
pressure on both ankle bones on 
a person who's sitting in the car 
— and I'll represent to you 
that Mr. Meyers has indicated, at 
one time, he was sitting in the 
— when that pressure was incurring, 
how would that twisting of the 
ankle have occurred? 
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A. It would be very simple. As a 
matter of fact, if I wanted to 
sprain your ankle, the easiest 
way to do it would be to first, 
stabilize it where it can't be 
removed, and then move your 
upper body one way or the other. 
And that's how sprains, usually 
occur. In other words, it's planted, 
fixed in one position, and then 
the -- the upper extremity as it 
moves, causes the tear. 
(R. 188, plaintiff's Exhibit 16, p. 21). (Dr. Thomason was 
unavailable as a witness at trial, and his deposition testimony 
was published and read to the jury). 
The only evidence was that the plaintiff's ankle 
injury occurred when it was caught in the car door on May 
31, 1983. Dr. Bauman and Dr. Thomason described the mechanism 
of the injury in medical terms as did the plaintiff in layman's 
terms. While the City Attorney in examining the plaintiff's 
witnesses continually attempted to elicit testimony that the 
ankle injury could not have happened or did not happen in 
this manner, there was no such testimony. 
Secondly, the City inaccurately states in its brief 
that 
The medical records show plaintiff 
Meyers severely twisted his ankle 
while elk hunting. Later, on a deer 
hunt, he also, apparently, injured 
his ankle requiring medical attention. 
(Brief of Appellant, p. 27). 
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The suggestion that Lee Meyers severely twisted 
his ankle while elk hunting is false. There is no reference 
to any injury elk hunting in plaintiff's medical records which 
make up the exhibit the City cites as the basis of this claim. 
In his office notes of October 21 Dr. Bauman made 
the following statement: 
Mr. Meyers returns today because 
he has been having increasing 
pain in his left ankle . Most of the 
pain is on the lateral aspect of the 
ankle. He has been deer hunting and 
this has aggravated it somewhat but 
it started even prior to the deer 
hunting. 
(Plaintiff's exhibit 1, office notes of Salt Lake Clinic, 
October 21, 1983). This office note contains no reference 
to any new injury while hunting and is the only reference 
in the records to hunting. 
Plaintiff testified that he went elk hunting shortly 
before this visit with Dr. Bauman, that his ankle was very 
sore at the time, and that he restricted his activity as a 
result. However, he denied any fall or any new injury (R. 
4-10). Dr. Bauman testified that Meyers reported no re-injury 
while hunting (R. 475). Furthermore, the doctor testified 
that his condition at that time of the October 21st visit 
presented no evidence of a new injury: 
Q. Doctor, on that occassion did 
you see any evidence by your 
examination of some inter-
vening accident or injury? 
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A. No. In fact, he was tender all 
the way around where he had sprained 
his ligaments, but I specifically 
stated that he was without any 
severe swelling or other 
specific findings in that area. 
So he had no great amount of 
swelling or evidence of a new 
injury at that time. 
(R. 475). 
While the City Attorney repeatedly raised the possibility 
at trial that the plaintiff had sustained a new injury to 
his ankle while deer hunting or elk hunting, there was never 
any such evidence, and the uncontroverted evidence was to the 
contrary. 
Finally, the City argues that the prejudicial impact 
of the letter is apparant because the jury found the City 
99% negligent even though "the whole incident was caused by 
plaintiff Meyer's refusal to obey the lawful directions of 
a police officer". (Brief of Appellant, p. 27). 
The City simply begs the question. Even Officer 
Nelson admitted that in interacting with a citizen in Mr. 
Meyers' position a police officer has an obligation to use 
reasonable care to avoid injuring him (R. 335) and the City 
has never contended otherwise. The letter was offered as 
evidence that Officer Nelson acted unreasonably in his actions 
toward the plaintiff and injured him. However, since the 
other evidence on this question was contradicted, it is virtually 
certain that the jury would have reached the same verdict 
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without the letter. In any event, the City has in no way 
demonstrated that the letter had a substantial effect on the 
outcome of the case. The introduction of the letter, if it 
was error, was harmless error. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has held that the ruling of a trial court 
as to the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed 
unless it is shown that the trial judge abused his discretion, 
Terry v. Zions Coop Mercantile Institution, (605) P.2d 314, 
332-323, 1979). The City has failed to demonstrate that the 
trial court abused its discretion by receiving the disputed 
letter. 
The City voluntarily mailed a letter to the plaintiff, 
admitting that his allegations about the conduct of a City 
police officer were true. When the plaintiff filed a lawsuit 
on account of that conduct, the City denied what it had previously 
admitted. The trial judge was entirely correct in ruling 
that the letter should be received in evidence as an admission 
by agents of Salt Lake City on a subject relevant to the lawsuit. 
Even if the court erred in receiving the letter, 
it could not have materially affected the jury's verdict since 
the evidence on the question of the City's liability was essentially 
uncontradicted. The judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this^L^ day of September, 1986. 
Timothy C. H<$dpt 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed this oL^ day of September, 1986, to the 
following: 
Greg R. Hawkins 
Assistant City Attorney 
100 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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WMGL DEPAOT&MP EL-"BUD"WILLOUGHBY 
^ . _ _ * - ^ CHIEF OF POLICE 
450 SOUTH THIRD EAST 
TELEPHONE 535-7222 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
July 1, 1983 
Lee R. Meyers 
885 East 575 North 
Layton, Utah 
84041 
Dear Sir, 
Re: I.A. Case #83/032 
On 5/31/83, you filed a complaint with our Internal 
Affairs Unit charging Officer James R. Nelson with excessive 
force- Your complaint was relative to an incident which 
occurred on 5/31/83, at 6th South and Main St. 
This letter is to inform you that the investigation is 
completed and the allegation contained in your complaint 
was determined to be "Sustained" by the Officer's division 
commander, Captain O.J. Peck. 
"Sustained" means: The event did occur and the officer 
is guilty of the complaint alleged or other infraction. 
We thank you for bringing this matter to our attention. 
If you have any questions concerning this investigation 
please contact Lt. W.C. Duncan, during normal working hours. 
Sincerely, 
E.L. "Bud" willoughby 
Chief of Police 
J& l>.C/&> 
W.C. Duncan 
Lieutenant 
Internal Affairs Division 
Salt Lake City Police Department 
WCD:lf 
cc: f i l e 
>-f\ 
APPENDIX B 
CONFIDENTIAL 
Salt Lake City Police Department 
Internal Affairs Unit ' 
CONPDENTW 
RESTRICTED MA T C - \ 'A7 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATION 
CITIZEN COMPLAINT AGAINST POLICE CONDUCT OR PROCEDURE 
IA CASE # 8 3 / 0 3 2 NOTARIZED: YES XXX NO 
SLCPD CASE # ASSIGNED TO t T 3 L A -
NATURE OF COMPLAINT Excessive Force (10) 
•AGAINST NELS0N> J-R" DIVISION W e S t 
CAPTAIN NOTIFIED g j
 PECK DATE fi/?/fi3 
LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE M a i n & 6 t h $ 0 U t h DATF 5 / 3 1 / 8 3 TIME 7 : 3 ° ^ 
DATE OF THIS REPORT snyaq TIME ng-nn TAKEN BY i t n.mran 
 
COMP LA INANT MEYERS, Lee 
ADDRESS R35 F 57R Nr laytnn, Utah ZIP CODE 84041 
PHONE # (H) 5 4 4 / 0 4 4 5
 ( R ) 535/7706 City Cemetary 
WITNESS MEYERS, Denise 
ADDRESS RfiS F 575 N/taytnn, lit 
544/0445 PHONE. 
DETAILS OF COMPLAINT:
 r ^ «.. , . , , « . * * e*u e ^ M • 
Comp attempting to make lef t turn at 6th S and Mam. 
Traffic was being controlled by Officer J.R. Nelson. Co^ p says Officer Nelson 
struck complainants car with his f i s t , cursed him, slamrred door on complainants 
ankle, twisted his right arm behind him and arrested him. Complainant is 
claiming damage to vehicle, damage to left leg and aright arm. No arrest made. 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SHOULD BE PLACED ON REVERSE OR ADDITIONAL SHEET 
•COMPLAINANT: READ BEFORE SIGNING: I REALIZE BY SIGNING THIS COMPLAINT 
THAT: 
1, I AGREE TO SUBMIT TO A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION TO VERIFY THE ABOVE 
INFORMATION, 
2, I REALIZE THAT IT IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE TO FALSIFY INFORMATION TO A 
MEMBER OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT j , 
SIGNATURE OF COMPLAINANT 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS a? DAY OF / 2 ^ , 1Q f ^ 
v J NOTARY 
„ _ . 7-/T- Zs-
-p , ^ COMMISSION FVPJRFS 
APPENDIX C 
INTLR'WL AFFAIRS DIVISION 
CO-PLAIW DISPOSITICN REVIpjf C O N F I D E N T I A L 
RESTRICTED MATE?.'At. 
•4HTERMAL APRAWS-WMSSTISATtOM -U 
I HAVE PERSONALLY REVIEWED THE FACTS AND FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATOR IN THIS 
CASE AND RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING DISPOSITION: 
\ IUNFOUNDED - The complaint, as reported didn't occur. 
( |EXONERATED - T ne event did occur as reported, but the officer's actions were 
lawful and reasonable. 
[ I NOT SUSTAINED - Facts do not support a conclusion of guilt or innocence on 
the part of the officer. Therefore, the complaint is resolved 
in his favor. 
XX SUSTAINED - The event did occur and the officer is guilty of the complaint 
alleged or other infraction. 
COf-MENTS:
 M t h o u a h t h e complainant was wrong in making the left turn described, i reex_ 
Officer over" reacted and used excessive force. The available physical evidence, i. 
bruises and discoloration of the complainant's skin and the dents and marks on the 
mobile/ are consistent with the complainant's allegations. All witnesses, except I 
agreed substantially on what took placg/with the exception of Nelson calling the cc 
lainant a SOB. 
It is my recommendation that this complaint be sustained and that Officer Nels 
receive two (2) days off without pay,/ 
/ 
6/27/83 
DATE 
I HAVE REVIEWED THE DICIPLINARY OR CORRECTIVE ACTION, IF ANY, TAKEN BY THE 
COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE ACCUSED AND... 
COMMENTS: 
I concur with the recommendation of Captain Peck. This officer has received many 
praising letter's and because of his past work, I believe that two days off without 
pat/, with the option to work the two days, is sufficient. Had he had problems in 
the past, I would recommend more. 
(p- £<7- F i^ 
DATE BUREAU COMMANDER 
'DATE CHIEF OF POLICE / • ™% 
